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Abstract. This article uses empirical evidence on networks of voluntary organiza-
tions mobilizing on ethnic minority, environmental, and social exclusion issues in two
British cities, to differentiate between social movement processes and other, cognate
collective action dynamics. Social movement processes are identified as the building
and reproducing of dense informal networks between a multiplicity of actors, sharing a
collective identity, and engaged in social and/or political conflict. They are contrasted
to coalitional processes, where alliances to achieve specific goals are not backed by
significant identity links, and organizational processes, where collective action takes
place mostly in reference to specific organizations rather than broader, looser networks.
Among his innumerable contributions to the study of social movements,
Charles Tilly has provided practitioners with what is probably the most
popular definition of their object of analysis: “a sustained series of
interactions between power-holders and persons successfully claiming
to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal representation, in
the course of which those persons make publicly visible demands for
change in the distribution or exercise of power, and back those demands
with public demonstrations of support.”1 Recently, however, the refer-
ence to “social movements” has lost centrality in his analytical scheme.
The “Dynamics of contention” program (henceforth “Doc”) invokes a
reorientation of the social movement research agenda toward the iden-
tification of mechanisms, which may be found to operate across highly
different episodes and forms of contentious politics.2 Its advocates re-
gard social movements as a particular form of political participation3
or, interchangeably, as broad episodes of contention – along with de-
mocratization, nationalism, and revolution – from the analysis of which
we can extract specific social mechanisms.4
There are very good reasons not to treat “social movements” as a
distinct set of phenomena, or to posit that there should be specific
intellectual sub-fields devoted to their exclusive study. Indeed, the
whole development of the field reflects recurrent cross-fertilization
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with neighboring areas of research, including the study of unions,
voluntary action, nationalism, and many others. However, there are
also risks attached to dispensing altogether with the concept of so-
cial movement, and focusing instead on other mechanisms and pro-
cesses, such as individual recruitment, cultural production, or identity-
building,5 which can contribute to our explanation of specific episodes
of contention, conventionally called “social movements.” Although we
broadly sympathize with the mechanism-based approach,6 we argue
that it is possible to refer to social movements as distinctive social pro-
cesses in their own right rather than as “phenomena” or even “episodes.”
In this article, we show how a network perspective differentiates social
movements from other instances of collective action and campaign-
ing. We start from a definition of social movements as “networks of
informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups, or as-
sociations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a
shared collective identity.”7 We use it to develop a typology of forms
of collective action. We then illustrate its heuristic power through the
analysis of networks of civic organizations in two British cities, Bristol
and Glasgow. In particular, we search for different dynamics within
networks of citizens’ organizations in Bristol and Glasgow by going
through the following steps: identify alliance patterns, i.e., the structure
of collaborations among organizations at a given time; look for indica-
tors of collective identity, by exploring the continuity of collaboration
over time and the extent of mutual recognition, as reflected in over-
lapping memberships; assess the conflictual nature of the interactions
taking place in the network. Throughout the article, we deliberately
avoid any reference to organizations’ substantive properties, and to the
relation between such properties and network structures. Our interest
here is focused on the identification of different network processes
within specific local settings.
Conflicts, networks, and identities
We can capture important differences between social movement pro-
cesses and other collective action processes – including adversarial
coalitions, voluntary campaigns on widely shared collective goals, or-
ganizational action – by looking at social movements as a particular
position in an analytical space defined by three dimensions:
• presence or absence of conflictual orientations to clearly identified
opponents;
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• dense or sparse informal exchanges between individuals or organi-
zations engaged in collective projects;
• strong or weak collective identity between members of those net-
works.
In particular, we see social movement processes as instances of collec-
tive action with clear conflictual orientations to specific social and po-
litical opponents, conducted in the context of dense inter-organizational
networking, by actors linked by solidarities and shared identities that
precede and survive any specific coalitions and campaigns.8 First, the
experience of social movements is inextricably linked to the public ex-
pression of a social conflict. Not only is collective action oriented to
address collective problems, redress injustices, achieve public goods,
tackle sources of grievances, or express support to some moral values or
principles; it does so by identifying targets for collective efforts, specif-
ically articulated in social or political terms. Collective action may be
associated with social movements (although not only with them) to the
extent that it challenges the behavior or the legitimacy of specific social
or political actors, not of single individuals or of the humankind taken
as a whole, not to mention the attribution of the problems addressed by
collective action to non-human causes, from natural disasters to divine
will.9
Second, the presence of dense informal inter-organizational networks
differentiates social movement processes from the innumerable in-
stances in which collective action takes place and is coordinated mostly
within the boundaries of specific organizations.10 A social movement
process is in place to the extent that both individual and organized
actors, while keeping their autonomy and independence, engage in
sustained exchanges of resources in pursuit of common goals. The
coordination of specific initiatives, the regulation of individual actors’
conduct, and the definition of strategies are all dependent on permanent
negotiations between the individuals and the organizations involved in
collective action. No single organized actor, no matter how powerful,
can claim to represent a movement as a whole. An important con-
sequence of the role of network dynamics is that more opportunities
arise for highly committed or skilled individuals to play an indepen-
dent role in the political process, than would be the case when action
is concentrated within formal organizations.
Finally, collective identity is essential inasmuch as a movement can-
not be reduced to any specific event or campaign, nor to a specific
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coalition, no matter how big their profile and impact. Indeed, a so-
cial movement process is in place when collective identities develop
that go beyond specific campaigns and initiatives. Collective identity
is a process strongly associated with recognition and the creation of
connectedness.11 It brings with it a sense of common purpose and
shared commitment to a cause, which enables single activists and or-
ganizations to regard themselves as inextricably linked to other actors,
not necessarily identical but surely compatible, in a broader collective
mobilization.12 Collective identity also enables actors to establish con-
nections among different occurrences, private and public, located at
different points in time and space, which are relevant to their experi-
ence, and that might as well have been conceived of as largely indepen-
dent from each other under different circumstances, and to weave them
in broader, encompassing narratives.13 As a result, organizational and
individual actors involved in collective action no longer merely pur-
sue specific goals, but come to regard themselves as elements of much
larger and encompassing processes of change – or resistance to change.
Within social movement networks, membership criteria are extremely
unstable and ultimately dependent on mutual recognition between ac-
tors; the activity of boundary definition – i.e., of defining who is and
who is not part of the network – indeed plays a central role in the
emergence and shaping of collective action.14
Looking at different combinations of the three properties listed above
enables us to contrast social movements to other collective action pro-
cesses. Here we focus on five15 of them (Table 1), keeping in mind that
no empirical episode of collective action – those that we convention-
ally define as “environmental movements,” “solidarity movements,”
“disabled movements,” or the like – fully corresponds to any of the
Table 1. A typology of collective action processes
Dense vs. sparse Network identity vs. Conflictual vs.
informal networks organizational identity consensual action
Conflictual Consensual
action action
Dense informal Strong network Social Consensus
networks identity movement movement
Dense informal Weak network Conflict Consensus
networks identity coalition coalition
Sparse informal Weak network Conflict Consensus
networks identity organization organization
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types presented here. In contrast, we can normally detect more than
one process within any empirical instance of collective action. The ex-
ploration of how such processes interact with each other represents a
fundamental step for the analysis.
Consensus movement processes
Coalitional networking and identities both characterize consensus
movements,16 as actors share solidarity and an interpretation of the
world, enabling them to link specific acts and events in a longer time
perspective. However, sustained collective action does not include a
conflictual element. Collective goods are often produced through co-
operative efforts that neither imply nor require the identification of
specific adversaries, trying to reduce the assets and opportunities of
one’s group or preventing chances to expand them. Problems to fight
may be attributed to natural disaster, bad luck, or – when it comes
to human error – to lack of information, skill, or education rather
than systematic, concerted efforts by one group to mislead the oth-
ers. Prospected solutions may not require redistribution of power nor
alterations in social structure but focus instead on service delivery, self-
help, personal and community empowerment. Likewise, the practice
and promotion of alternative lifestyles need not include the presence of
opponents defined in social and political terms. Collective actors may
fight ethereal adversaries, ranging from bad or conventional taste, in
the case of artistic and style-oriented movements, to “the inner enemy,”
in the case of some religious movements, without necessarily blaming
any social actors for the state of things they intend to modify.
Conflictual coalitional processes
In these cases, collective actors are densely connected to each other
in terms of alliances, and may identify opponents explicitly, but those
alliances are not backed by strong identity links. The networks among
actors mobilizing on a common goal take a purely contingent and
instrumental nature. Resource mobilization and campaigning are then
conducted mainly through exchanges and pooling of resources between
distinct groups and organizations. The latter rather than the network is
the main source of participants’ identities and loyalties. Once a specific
battle has been fought, there need not be any longer term legacy as far
as identity and solidarity is concerned, nor attempts to connect the
specific campaign in a broader framework. If that is the case, networks
are then the expression of pure coalitional processes, where actors
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instrumentally share resources in order to achieve specific goals, yet
do not develop any particular sense of belonging and of common future
during the process.17 Once actors have achieved their aims – or once
it has become clear they cannot reach them – the coalitional process
terminates, with no further practical or ideational bonds between the
parties involved in it.
Consensus coalitional processes
Similar considerations apply to cases in which resources are pooled
to pursue specific practical goals, yet without a narrative placing the
distinct episodes into broader frameworks, and without broader iden-
tities developing out of the action. All instances of organizations, en-
gaging in dense networking to produce collective goods, to address
practical problems, to facilitate the spread of certain lifestyles or cul-
tural practices, without identifying any specific social or political tar-
gets, may provide illustrations of this particular process. For example,
coalitions promoted by transnational humanitarian NGOs to address
particular crises in some regions of the world usually act without tak-
ing on any specific opponent; the same often happens to voluntary
organizations working on social exclusion when they join forces to
address specific domestic issues such as homelessness under freezing
winter conditions, or emergencies caused by natural forces such as
floods, earthquakes, and the like.18
Conflictual organizational processes
In this model, the density of the networks linking different actors is
low and the identity links between them are weak. Collective action
is largely conducted within specific organizations, i.e., in the form of
stable, purposive interactions between individuals or collective units,
with some established membership criteria and some patterned mech-
anisms of coordination and internal regulation.19 Such organizations
may display varying degrees of formalization and radicalization, rang-
ing from revolutionary parties such as the Nazis or the Bolsheviks to
reform-oriented ones such as those in the labor or Christian–democrat
tradition, from church-related associations to public-or private-interest
groups, from voluntary organizations to informal grassroots groups.
Whatever their specific forms, resource mobilization and campaign-
ing activities will be shaped by the norms and procedures established
within the organizations interested in certain issues. The actors with
legitimacy to mobilize will be those who do so through organizations,
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and there will be few opportunities for individuals to play any role
unless their participation is mediated by specific organizations. Orga-
nizations will compete to acquire full control of their issues or at least
to secure distinct niches.
Consensual organizational processes
These processes differ from other organizational processes because of
the lack of a conflictual element. They are best illustrated by those
innumerable instances in which services and other public goods are
produced within specific organizations with little going on in terms of
networking and inter-organizational exchanges. Most voluntary orga-
nizations seem to operate according to this logic most of the time. A
focus on non-controversial goals or on service delivery may often – if
not necessarily – result in a pattern of action where the most important
ties by far are those with public representatives and agencies responsi-
ble for specific policy areas, or possibly with private sponsors. Heavy
reliance on institutions, competition dynamics with other organizations
or, conversely, pronounced division of labor may each contribute to re-
ducing the relevance of alliance building between voluntary actors.20
Before illustrating how different processes may be identified in specific
episodes of collective action at the local level, it is advisable to preempt
some of the ambiguities and misunderstandings that the very emphasis
on definitions may encourage. To begin with, insisting on conflict as
a distinctive trait of movements need not force social movement ana-
lysts away from the investigation of those instances of collective action
where a conflict is difficult to identify, such as those oriented to per-
sonal change and those focusing on the delivery of some kind of help
or assistance to an aggrieved collectivity. Both conflictual and consen-
sual dynamics may usually be found within the same broad phenomena.
For example, although environmental action often displays a conflictual
element, when it takes the form of sustained collective efforts, involv-
ing a variety of groups and organizations, attempting to protect the
environment through voluntary work, or to transform environmental
consciousness through education, it approximates a consensus move-
ment process. The same often applies to those episodes of collective
action usually referred to as solidarity movements. In those cases, a
broad collective identity may well bring together people, organizations,
events, and initiatives in meaningful, long-term collective projects,
transcending the boundaries of any specific organization or campaign,
but the space for conflictual dynamics may vary substantially.21
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Nor does stressing the peculiarity of movements as informal networks
rule out social movement theorists analyzing specific organizations,
as suggested by some critics.22 Instead, it forces analysts to recognize
explicitly, by elaborating specific concepts, the distinction between so-
cial movement processes and organizational processes. Rather than
looking at groups as diverse as Common Cause or the Nazi party as
“movements,” applying to them the same label used for networks of
multiple organizations, it will be important to use a rigorous definition
of movements to identify the co-presence and interaction within each of
them of both movement and (bureaucratic) organizational processes.
For example, recognizing such differences enables us to specify the
distinction better between the Nazi party and the Nazi movement, and
to explore the interaction between the two processes. We could map the
extent and the shape of the links, connecting the various right-wing and
paramilitary organizations that provided in the late 1910s and 1920s the
backbone of what was to become the Nazi party.23 We could then doc-
ument how the NSDAP and its most directly connected organizations
came to play an increasingly central role in the right-wing network. We
could also illustrate how eventually formal links between the Party, its
individual members, and its collateral organizations came to replace
almost totally the informal links between them through (a) the defi-
nition of formal criteria for individual membership in the Party, and
(b) the domination of the party over any other organization, including
the SS. Far from preventing us from analyzing movements that largely
overlap with a specific organization, a view of a movement as an in-
formal network of several individuals and organizations would help us
identify the tension between movement and organizational dynamics
within complex empirical cases of collective action and possibly to
trace its evolution over time.24
It is also important to remember that associating movements with a
distinctive collective identity implies no assumptions about the homo-
geneity of the actors sharing that identity.25 We have a social movement
identity to the extent that groups or individuals feel part of a collec-
tivity, mobilized to support or oppose social change; that they identify
shared elements in their past, present, and future experiences; and that
other social or political actors be held responsible for the state of af-
fairs being challenged. Whether a specific collective identity will be
inclusive or exclusive; the degree to which holders of such identity
will share one or several traits; the range of behaviors and lifestyles
that will be associated with such identity, are empirical questions that
may find totally different answers in different contexts. For example,
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the Italian radical left-wing movements of the 1970s seemed to be
more homogenous (if far from totally homogenous) in terms of their
members’ orientations and lifestyles than the environmental movement
that followed them in the 1980s.26 If anything, strong similarity among
individuals and organizations sharing the same exclusive identity will
tend to correspond with cases in which movement dynamics tend to be
weakest, such as mass parties (the already mentioned NSDAP being
an excellent example) or religious sects, where the movement dynamic
ends when sect members refuse to recognize any common ground with
people subscribing to other cults.
Exchanges, identity, and conflict in citizens’ networks
The study
We look for collective action processes within networks of orga-
nizations mobilizing on environmental, ethnic, minority, commu-
nity, and social exclusion issues. These organizations provide a par-
ticularly interesting unit for the analysis of coalition-building and
inter-organizational networking: they are distinct enough to work
independently, yet have enough potential areas of convergence to ren-
der cross-sector alliances a feasible option (e.g., on issues such as
North–South relations, peace, refugees, urban decay, racism, etc.). Be-
tween 2001 and 2002, face-to-face interviews took place with rep-
resentatives of 124 organizations in Glasgow and 134 in Bristol.
These included both local branches of UK-wide organizations (in
Glasgow, also Scotland-wide), and independent local groups, with a
varying degree of formalization and bureaucratization. All the or-
ganizations that played a city-wide role were contacted;27 as for
community organizations, rather than taking a small sample from
across the city, efforts were concentrated on two areas, both relatively
deprived.28
Respondents were asked to identify up to five most important partners
in alliances. They were also invited to identify any additional important
collaboration with groups belonging to any of the following categories:
environmental organizations, ethnic organizations, community organi-
zations, churches, political parties, unions, and other economic interest
groups, other voluntary organizations, other organizations. The result-
ing data on alliances should not be treated as a list of the groups with
which our respondents exchanged most frequently or most intensely
in objective terms, but of those they perceived as their most important
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allies at the time of the interview. Accordingly, the matrix of alliances,
which represents the basis of our analysis, is best interpreted as an
indicator of perceptions of closeness rather than objective intensity of
exchange. It reflects, in other words, how organizations perceive their
social space and identify their most relevant contacts within it.
Inter-organizational alliances
The overall density of the 124 actors alliance network in Glasgow is
0.023, corresponding to 2.3% of the total number of possible ties among
the organizations interviewed. In Bristol, the density of the 134 actors
is slightly lower at 0.016 (1.6% of possible ties). Even though only
a tiny proportion of possible links is activated in both cities, making
sense of how inter-organizational collaborations combine in broader
network patterns is no easy task. A clustering procedure29 enables us
to simplify the structures and bring them down in both cases to three
blocks of organizations, occupying the same structurally equivalent
position: namely, identifying the same actors in the network as their
closest allies.30
The distribution of density scores within and across the three struc-
turally equivalent blocks points at some striking similarities between
the Glasgow and the Bristol cases (Table 2 and Table 3). As a
non-parametric test suggests,31 in both cities we can identify blocks
(Glasgow 3 and Bristol 3), the incumbents of which are related to each
other much more frequently than is the case across the network as a
whole, and also engage with actors in other blocks relatively frequently
(Figure 1). Organizations in block 3 are not only structurally equiva-
lent following similar ties to third parties, they are also densely tied to
each other. In general, organizations in block 3 are also more likely to
identify organizations in other blocks as allies than to be identified as
such by them.
Table 2. Densities in the interorganizational alliances network
Glasgow Bristol
Blocks Glasgow 1 Glasgow 2 Glasgow 3 Bristol 1 Bristol 2 Bristol 3
1 0.034 0.023 0.018 0.021 0.011 0.024
2 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.013
3 0.024 0.022 0.071 0.026 0.012 0.083
N 45 38 41 50 59 25
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Table 3. Non-parametric estimates of the density of alliance ties in structurally equiv-
alent blocks in Glasgow and Bristol
Glasgow Bristol
Model fit R-square Sig. R-square Sig.
0.015 0.000 0.013 0.000
Stdized Stdized
coefficient Sig. coefficient Sig.
Ties within Block 1 0.039 0.004 Ties within Block 1 0.023 0.027
Ties within Block 2 −0.027 0.007 Ties within Block 2 −0.032 0.000
Ties within Block 3 0.112 0.000 Ties within Block 3 0.105 0.000
At the same time, we can also identify clusters of organizations
(Glasgow 2 and Bristol 2; see Figure 2) whose structural equivalence
depends overwhelmingly on their receiving ties from organizations
located in other structural positions. As Table 3 shows, incumbency
in this block is significantly and negatively correlated to the chance of
having links to other organizations in the same position. The density of
Block 2 is extremely low in both cities; as an average, their incumbents
engage with only 0.17 groups in the same block in Glasgow and 0.22 in
Bristol. Ties to organizations in other blocks are also rare in Glasgow,
and only marginally more frequent in Bristol (Table 2). The dominant
style of networking in these blocks sees organizations being important
partners to other members of the network (particularly in Glasgow, but
also in Bristol), but not particularly engaged with the network as a
whole (neither internally nor externally) when it comes to identify al-
liance partners. This does not mean that these organizations are weakly
networked in absolute terms; simply, they either work mainly with other
actors (such as churches, institutions, schools, or the umbrella orga-
nizations we have deliberately excluded from this analysis) or with
organizations outside the sectors covered by the survey (none of which
however was mentioned as a partner more than three times).
Finally, both networks include a cluster of organizations (Glasgow 1
and Bristol 1; see Figure 3) that are linked internally by a significant
number of ties (as the positive and significant coefficient in Table 3
suggests). They also engage with other blocks to a significant degree,
if to a lower degree than those in block 3. Networks within block 1 also
show greater average distance between organizations. Organizations in
block 3 are embedded in alliance systems such that each organization’s
allies are also likely to be linked to each other; where, in other words,
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alliances seem overall fully compatible and somehow interchangeable.
In block 1, in contrast, alliances rather take the form of long chains, as
if they were overall more dispersed. There are also some differences
between the two blocks. Bristol 1 is more segmented than Glasgow 1,
having four components (rather than one) that are disconnected from
the rest of the network.
The main traits of the inter-organizational alliance networks and the
associated features of collective action in the two cities may be sum-
marized as follows:
• a strongly imbalanced distribution of ties within the civic sector;
• a set of organizations (those in block 3) with a strong propensity to
establish allies with organizations in the same structural position;
• another set of organizations (those in block 1) involved in a relatively
dense network of ties to each other, yet inclined to spread their
connections across the civic sector rather than concentrate alliances
among themselves;
• a third set of organizations (the incumbents of block 2) either acting
largely on their own or being regarded as important partners by
others, but without reciprocating those perceptions. Although the
process is more pronounced in Glasgow than in Bristol, the block
density is very low in both cities by comparison to the other blocks.
If social movement processes are defined by dense networks among a
plurality of actors, engaged in social conflict on the basis of a shared
collective identity, then the first condition is definitely more present in
blocks 1 and 3, than in block 2. To evaluate the presence of the other
analytical dimensions, though, we must bring other variables into the
equation.
Shared memberships, participation in public events,
and collective identity
Do organizations involved in alliances also feel links to their partners,
which go beyond specific initiatives or campaigns and also imply
some kind of broader and long-term mutual commitment? Do they,
in other words, share a collective identity? Although identity is very
difficult to measure as such, we can use several indicators to test the
presence of identity dynamics within a given social network. Here we
focus on two of them, related to the sharing of core members between
two organizations and to joint past participation in a series of public –
often protest – events in the two cities. First, we can test the extent of
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identity mechanisms in networks of organizations by looking at their
links, based on shared core activists. Although in the case of business
organizations shared personnel may simply reflect mechanisms of
control,32 this is different for voluntary organizations that rest largely
on solidarity incentives. There, multiple involvements provide an
indicator, no matter how rough, of whether core activists perceive two
organizations as compatible and close to the point of sharing their
individual commitments between them.33
Second, the extent to which two organizations participated in rele-
vant public events in their cities in the recent past tells us how much
their current alliances can be regarded as the last instance of what is
ultimately a string of sustained collaborations over time. By this to-
ken, it is plausible to assume that identity dynamics – in particular,
that element that relates to the continuity of identification over time
– are stronger, the stronger the links based on joint past participa-
tion in the same events are. To measure these links, we generated two
actor-by-event matrices, recording whether organizations had taken
part in any of 26 events in Glasgow and 17 events in Bristol over
the last few years. These ranged from militant to institutional activi-
ties, including both grassroots action campaigns and council-supported
festivals and conventions; they covered each of the thematic areas of
interest to our project, from environmentalism to ethnic minorities
to social exclusion. In both cities a link was recorded between two
organizations if they had participated in at least three of the events
listed.34
In the light of these criteria we checked to what extent the distribution
of identity ties across the three blocks (Table 4), defined in reference to
alliance ties, matched the distribution of the latter. We applied the same
test used for alliances to identity linkages, consisting of the combination
Table 4. Densities in the identity network (shared activists or joint participation in
past events)
Glasgow Bristol
Blocks Glasgow 1 Glasgow 2 Glasgow 3 Bristol 1 Bristol 2 Bristol 3
1 0.049 0.027 0.083 0.058 0.042 0.109
2 0.027 0.009 0.041 0.040 0.025 0.078
3 0.084 0.043 0.246 0.106 0.075 0.208
N 45 38 41 50 59 25
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Table 5. Non-parametric estimates of the density of identity ties (on the basis of
shared activists or joint participation in past events) in structurally equivalent blocks
in Glasgow and Bristol
Glasgow Bristol
Model fit R-square Sig. R-square Sig.
0.062 0.000 0.017 0.000
Stdized Stdized
coefficient Sig. coefficient Sig.
Ties within Block 1 −0.003 0.505 Ties within Block 1 −0.010 0.400
Ties within Block 2 −0.049 0.036 Ties within Block 2 −0.064 0.005
Ties within Block 3 0.238 0.000 Ties within Block 3 0.108 0.001
of ties based on joint members with ties based on joint participation in
important public events in the two cities in the recent past (Table 5).35
Given the difficulty to establish how dense collective identity links
should be to qualify as “strong,” we decided to regard identity in a
given structural position as strong when the density of identity links
in that position exceeded significantly the average distribution of such
links in a given city.
Network patterns emerging from the analysis are entirely consistent
across the two cities, and mostly consistent with those found for the
alliance network. In both Glasgow and Bristol, similarly to what hap-
pened in the case of alliances, organizations located in block 2 are
significantly unlikely to have identity links to each other; if they have
some connection through shared members or their history of activism
in the city, that is likely to be with groups who occupy a different po-
sition in alliance patterns. From the point of view of our typology, the
coupling of low involvement in both alliance networks and identity
networks suggests block 2 to be most closely characterized by what we
called organizational processes. In contrast, and again analogously to
the pattern that emerged from the alliance network, organizations in
block 3 show significant, positive inclinations to share identity links
with organizations in the same position. Following our logic of analy-
sis, the combination of dense alliance networks and dense identity net-
works suggests the chance of movement processes going on in block 3
is high in both cities.36 The only but important difference to the pattern
identified for the alliance network lies in the distribution of identity ties
among incumbents of block 1. In both Glasgow and Bristol, the signifi-
cantly high density of ties within the position satisfied our first criterion
for a social movement dynamic. However, in both cities organizations
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in block 1 do not appear significantly connected by identity ties (Ta-
ble 5). The lack of a match between dense alliance networks and identity
networks suggests that, in that case, coalitional processes are taking
place rather than movement ones.
Conflict networks
We also have to take into account that the structure of civic networks
in Glasgow and Bristol reflects deep differences in the extent of con-
flictual orientations, both within and across the two cities. When asked
about their two most important initiatives in the last few years, orga-
nizations were also invited to indicate whether such actions implied
a conflict with some public or private actors. The former included
national and local government as well as other public agencies, inter-
national and supranational institutions, etc.; the latter, specific social
groups, whether defined along class, ethnic, gender, or other lines. In
both cities, about one quarter of respondents’ main initiatives targeted
specific public actors, about one eighth targeted private actors. How-
ever, the distribution of responses across blocks partially differs in the
two cities (Table 6). In both Glasgow and Bristol, organizations in block
3 – the likeliest candidates to social movement status because of their
network density – were significantly more inclined to identify specific
public opponents, than organizations in blocks 1 and 2. In Bristol, how-
ever, organizations in block 3 did not stand out in terms of their conflict
orientations to private actors. Not only that, overall, the propensity to
identify specific opponents was more evenly spread in Bristol than in
Glasgow, where a deep gap separated in particular organizations in
block 3 from the others.
Table 6. Percentage of groups identifying public authorities and/or specific social
groups as opponents in their main initiatives
Glasgow Bristol
Glasgow Glasgow Glasgow Bristol Bristol Bristol
1 2 3 Total 1 2 3 Total
Public 17.8% 5.3% 48.8% 24.2% 24% 22% 44% 26.9%
authorities
Specific 11.1% 5.3% 24.4% 13.7% 10% 15.3% 12% 12.7%
social
groups
N 45 38 41 124 50 59 25 134
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Patterns of collective action: A relational typology
The data in the previous section clearly suggest that networks of inter-
organizational alliances do not tell the whole story when it comes to
analyzing collective action processes. Similar densities in alliances
may correspond to quite different network structures if we look at
other links, such as those based on past events or joint memberships.
Taking those differences into account, as well as the varying weight
of conflictual orientations in organizations’ activities, we can iden-
tify in the two cities three out of the six processes we introduced
earlier:
• Social movement processes are most clearly illustrated by block
3 in Glasgow and – to a large extent – in Bristol. There, inter-
organizational ties more frequently coincide with links, created by
participation in past events, or by joint activists. The relational
dimension stretches beyond collaborations among organizations,
which might in themselves also be purely instrumental, to suggest
bonds and shared identities, which secure continuity to the network.
This pattern also matches conflictual orientations, particularly in
Glasgow, where both social and political opponents are identified
– in Bristol, the movement dynamic seems to take a distinctively
political rather than social emphasis.
• Consensus coalitional processes. In block 1 in Glasgow and block
1 in Bristol, a fairly dense web of alliances finds little correspon-
dence in ties, which more explicitly point at the presence of identity
links. The gap between organizational exchanges and those links,
measuring continuity of commitment over time and activists’ per-
sonal involvement, is indeed particularly pronounced. Networking
is limited to collaboration on specific issues. Coalitional dynamics
seem to be operating there, but little can be found in the form of
social movement relational processes. Organizations in this block
also seem reluctant to recognize conflictual elements in their action.
• Consensus organizational processes. These are best illustrated by
block 2 in Glasgow and in Bristol, where networking within the
civic sector and within the position is weak, and organizations seem
to hold a largely non-conflictual identity. Links between organiza-
tions are modest, however measured. Density is consistently low by
comparison to the other blocks, as to suggest that the main focus
for organizations in those blocks is organizational activities per se
rather than the development of links to other actors occupying sim-
ilar structural positions. They are not involved in distinctive sets of
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alliances, nor are they linked by connections implying some level of
collective identity with other groups. In their case, structural equiva-
lence seems to depend largely on those organizations being identified
by others as relevant partners in alliances; but their overall involve-
ment in the network is limited. Organizations in that position are
also markedly reluctant to recognize a conflictual dimension to their
action. The propensity to identify specific targets is particularly low,
especially with reference to public actors. To summarize, the rela-
tional and the contentious dimensions of social movement action are
both distinctly absent here.
Conclusions
Our characterization of social movements, although broadly inspired
by current dominant approaches, cannot be reduced to any of them.
On the one hand, it differs from visions of movements, which recog-
nize the network dimension, yet emphasize mainly its interpersonal,
small group element, to the detriment of the organizational and coali-
tional element.37 A social movement process is occurring to the extent
that long-term bonds and shared identities translate into sustained net-
works between independent actors – most frequently organizations, al-
though one cannot rule out in principle the role of individual activists
– in pursuit of shared goals. Otherwise, what we have are counter-
cultural or sub-cultural processes, that the corresponding concepts38
do a better job of analyzing. As suggested by work on, among oth-
ers, American feminism, British environmental direct action, Italian
environmentalism,39 constant attention has to be paid to the interplay
of interpersonal and inter-organizational networks.
At the same time, viewing social movements as a particular form of
network organization40 assigns networks a more central role than ad-
vocates of the “classic social movement agenda” (i.e., of the “political
process’ and “resource mobilization” perspectives) seem prepared to
concede. For those subscribing to Tilly’s definition of movements, a
social movement is first of all a specific form of contention, sustained,
national – or at least non-local – in scope, based on a modular reper-
toire of collective action.41 Networks and organizations are either the
precondition or the outcome of a movement – or both. For the ap-
proach presented in this article, network processes – better, a specific
type of network processes – are the movement. Indeed, movement ac-
tion has to do as much with the constant redefinition of identity and
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solidarity links between actors – i.e., with the drawing and re-drawing
of network boundaries – as with challenges to powerholders.42 The pur-
posive, goal-oriented element of collective action, reflected in coalition
networks, is supported by, and intertwines with, longer term identifica-
tions and bonds. Failing to recognize the coupling of alliance and iden-
tity networks implies blurring the boundaries between coalitional and
social movement processes – which can both sustain “interactions with
power-holders.” In contrast, our approach highlights the substantial dif-
ferences, running behind coalition work that on face value could all be
brought under the same, vague, heading of “movement networking.”
If networks are movements, an obvious development of this research
program consists of asking whether and to what extent the processes
identified here match those traits and orientations of social movement
actors that analysts have traditionally focused on. In particular, to what
extent does our typology differ from conventional ones, contrasting
social movements to interest groups, which are apparently the equiva-
lent to our “organizational processes”? If the homophily principle leads
us to expect some overlap of structural positions and actors’ categor-
ical traits,43 a total overlap would render the whole exercise proposed
here purely academic – if not deprived of some confirmatory value.
To explore this issue, we should ask whether organizations involved in
social movement relational process also differed significantly in action
repertoires (consistently with views of protest as a distinctive trait of so-
cial movements),44 organizational forms (with social movements more
likely to consist of loosely structured, grassroots organizations),45 rela-
tionships with authorities (with social movements as anti-institutional
phenomena),46 and opinions (with social movements as carriers of crit-
ical beliefs and anti-institutional orientations).47 So far, preliminary
explorations of our data confirm some widely held assumptions, yet
qualify others significantly. They suggest in particular that the correla-
tion between organizational properties or inclination to protest and our
three processes is far from perfect, as social movement processes do not
appear necessarily as the domain of loosely structured, protest-prone
organizations.48
Exploring the matching of actors’ traits and structural properties would
also enable us to address another question raised by our findings, con-
cerning the configuration of social movement and other collective ac-
tion processes in different political settings. Glasgow and Bristol are
usually regarded as very different in terms of political history, degree
of radicalism in local politics, shape of local cleavages, as well as class
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composition and recent patterns of urban transformation.49 Yet the con-
figuration of networks in the two cities presents remarkable similarities.
It might be interesting then to map the substantive characteristics of the
actors who occupy similar structural positions in order to check whether
and how local political cultures and local political milieus affect the
network organization of grassroots politics and volunteering.
Differentiating between conflictual and consensual processes, and
among movement, coalitional, and organizational processes, is par-
ticularly important at a time when the use of the expression “social
movement” seems to be increasingly limited to the identification of
empirical episodes from which one should then extract specific pro-
cesses and mechanisms.50 Although there is a lot to recommend the
strategy of searching for mechanisms across a broad range of instances
of political contention, there are also good reasons to recognize in so-
cial movements a specific social process, and to develop around such
recognition a distinctive research program.51 Far from restricting un-
duly the domain of social movement research, a focus on networks as a
form of social organization, and a closer integration of analytical work
on concepts and empirical research, may actually expand the potential
of dialogue between different social science communities. At the same
time, it may give social movement research a distinct theoretical, rather
than merely empirical, focus.
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